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A person has a normative power if she has the ability to alter rights and duties 
in the right way. I’m going to say that the right way is ‘directly’. It is hard to 
characterise what ‘direct’ means here, and I will say more about that in a 
moment. But at least something like this is true: it is sufficient for a person to 
alter rights and duties directly that she intentionally and sincerely 
communicates to the appropriate people that she does so, and the exercise of 
her normative power is not made invalid by the circumstances in which the 
intention is communicated. The person with the power need not alter anything 
else that grounds rights or duties.  
Thus, for example, if X has authority over Y with respect to v, X can give 
Y a duty to v simply by ordering Y to v, and it is sufficient for ordering Y to v 
that X communicates to Y the order to v sincerely, with the appropriate 
intentions and so on, and without any invalidating circumstances. If Y owes X 
a consent-sensitive duty not to v, X can release Y from her duty not to v simply 
by consenting to v, and it is sufficient for consent that X successfully 
communicates to Y that he consents, with the appropriate intentions and so on, 
and without any invalidating circumstances. And if ving is something that X 
can validly promise Y to do, X can give herself a duty to v simply by promising 
Y that she will v, and it is sufficient for promising that X communicates to Y 
that she promises, with the appropriate intentions and so on, and without any 
invalidating circumstances.  
The relevant invalidating circumstances have at least some similarity 
across normative powers. X does not successfully exercise the power if she is 
coerced, deceived, lacks capacity, and so on. There is some variation in the 
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circumstances that invalidate normative powers. But that variation is not 
between kinds of normative power. Validity conditions depend on the stakes 
(perhaps amongst other things). For example, it takes a great deal of 
involuntary intoxication to invalidate my consent to your using my pen; much 
less to invalidate my consent to your destroying my car.  
 A general theory of normative powers aims to explain the full range of 
normative powers. Such a theory should explain why we have normative 
powers in particular, rather than just having things that are close to, but not 
identical to, normative powers. We might have the power to generate facts that 
then ground duties and permissions. For example, I might have the power to 
injure a person, and if I exercise that power, a doctor might then have a duty to 
cure the person. But I lack the normative power to give the doctor a duty to 
cure the person. Such a power is not a normative power – it is distinguished by 
the fact that the rights and duties created are not created directly. The tricky 
question is how to characterise the difference between altering another’s rights 
and duties directly and altering them indirectly. 
Later, we will see that many of the functions that normative powers 
seem to serve do not rely on normative powers; it is sufficient that the person 
has the power to alter rights and duties indirectly. That insight helps us to 
understand and focus on the distinctive quality of normative powers. 
 For the most part, the literature on normative powers has focused on 
particular normative powers – there are distinct literatures on consent, 
authority, and promising, for example. 1  Sometimes, that literature aims to 
draw conclusions about one power by comparing it with others. There is no 
doubt a great deal to say about particular normative powers that does not 
generalise. But there are also some general issues that can guide us in our 
account of particular normative powers.  
                                                 
1  There are important exceptions, such as D Owens Shaping the Normative 
Landscape (Oxford: OUP, 2012). 
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My aim in this paper is somewhat preliminary: to explore what is 
distinctive about normative powers, and to show that tempting instrumental 
arguments fail to explain their distinctive features. I will also distinguish and 
briefly discuss kinds of argument that promise to explain the distinctive 
qualities of normative powers. 
 
I. General Questions 
 
Let’s begin with some clear pairs of cases where a person has the ability to alter 
rights and duties either directly or indirectly, where the first case in the pair 
involves the exercise of a normative power and the second does not. Amongst 
the range of normative powers, I’ll pick consent, authority and promising. 
We’ll see that there is a general contrast between the exercise of such powers, 
and indirect ways of altering rights and duties, that is similar across different 
normative powers. That gives us at least some reason to think that the problem 
of normative powers is, at least in some ways, general. 
One set of contrasts between normative powers and indirect ways in 
which rights and duties arise concerns the contrast between the power to alter 
rights and duties directly and the power to alter facts whose value 
independently gives rise to the relevant rights and duties. 
 Consider: 
 
Bike: X communicates to Y that Y is permitted to use X’s bike. 
 
Bike II: X leaves the gas on in the flat that he shares with Y. The only way 
for Y to get back to the flat quickly enough to prevent a fire is to use X’s 
bike.  
 
In both cases, X acts in a way that results in Y having a permission to use X’s 
bike. And in both cases, X lacks a right that Y does not use X’s bike. But X only 
exercises a normative power – the power of consent - in Bike, and not in Bike II.  
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Key: Y manages X’s holiday home for her. X instructs Y to give the keys 
to Z, who wants to rent the property. 
 
Key II: X has locked Z’s child in her holiday home, and only Y now has 
the key. Z can prevent the child from becoming very distressed only if 
she is given the key.  
 
In both cases, X has acted in a way that results in Y having a duty to give the 
key to Z. But X exercises a normative power – the power of authority - only in 
Key and not in Key II.  
  
Car: X promises Y that Y will be able to use X’s car on Tuesday. 
 
Car II: X breaks Y’s car, so Y will not be able to get to the hospital unless 
Y uses X’s car.  
 
X acts in a way that results in his having a duty to lend Y his car in both cases, 
but X exercises a normative power – the power of promising - only in Car and 
not Car II.  
A related set of cases involves revealing information which is sufficient, 
independently, to give rise to the relevant (evidence-relative) duties. Consider: 
 
Bike III: X tells Y that the gas has been left on in Y’s flat. The only way 
for Y to get to the flat quickly enough to prevent a fire is to use X’s bike.  
 
X has ‘given’ Y the permission to use his bike. He has acted in a way that results 
in Y being evidence-relative permitted to use the bike that Y lacked prior to 
being given the relevant evidence by X. But X does not exercise a normative 
power. Similar examples can be found across normative powers. 
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 One person might also give another evidence that a normative power 
has been exercised, and thus act in a way that gives rise to an evidence-relative 
right or duty, without exercising a normative power. For example, Z might give 
Y compelling evidence that X has consented to Y using X’s bike. Z does not 
exercise a normative power, whether or not Z is being truthful. Again, this kind 
of case can be found across normative powers. 
 Finally, even where a person has a normative power, and successfully 
alters rights and duties that the power is concerned with, the normative power 
is exercised only if the alteration comes about in the right way. Consider: 
 
Causal Commander: X commands Y to rescue a child in a lake when there 
is no child in the lake. His giving the command frightens a child, who 
then falls into the lake. 
 
X’s command gives rise to Y being required to do what X has commanded her 
to do. But he has not exercised a normative power. Again, it is easy enough to 
imagine similar cases across normative powers. For example,  
 
Causal Consent: X threatens Y to consent to Z using Y’s bike. Y consents, 
and his consenting causes a fire to start which Z can put out only by 
using the bike.  
 
Assuming that coercion makes Y’s consent invalid, Y doesn’t exercise the 
normative power, even though by consenting Y made it true that Z is permitted 
to do what Y consented to. 
When considering these cases, we are immediately struck by the 
similarity between the pairs of cases across different normative powers. At least 
initially, there seems something similar in the way in which these powers 
succeed or fail, both in cases where the underlying facts are either altered or 
not, and in epistemic cases.  
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 Perhaps there are also differences between normative powers. For 
example, some claim that some normative powers require successful 
communication where others do not. For example, abandoning property can 
certainly be done without communicating with others. Some, though, think 
that promising and consent require successful communication.2  Although I 
have my doubts about this particular contrast, even if it is right it only suggests 
that any general theory of normative powers must explain the commonalities 
that exist across normative powers. A good theory will offer a powerful 
account of the common features of normative powers whilst leaving room for 
differences between them. 
 
II. Pro Tanto Directed Duties and Normative Powers 
 
Here is a further general set of ideas about normative powers. To understand 
them, first focus on the idea of power-sensitive rights and duties. These are 
rights and duties that are grounded on the exercise of a normative power. For 
example, a consent-sensitive duty is a duty that one person has not to perform 
a certain act where consent will ground her being released from that duty. An 
authority-sensitive duty is a duty that a person has to perform a certain act that 
is grounded in another person having commanded it. A promise-sensitive duty 
is a duty that a person has to perform a certain act that is grounded in her 
promising to do it. We have already seen that the relevant rights and duties 
need not exclusively be grounded in the exercise of normative powers – they 
                                                 
2 See, for example, T Dougherty ‘Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication’ 
(2015) 43 Philosophy and Public Affairs 224; ‘On Wrongs and Crimes: Does Consent 
Require only an Attempt to Communicate?’ (2019) 12 Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 409; H Liberto ‘Promises and the Backward Reach of Uptake’ (2018) 
55 American Philosophical Quarterly 15. For a response, see V Tadros ‘Responses 
to Wrongs and Crimes’ (2019) 13 Criminal Law and Philosophy 455. 
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can also arise indirectly. But, in many circumstances, the exercise of a 
normative power is required for the relevant right or duty to arise. 
What kinds of duty are normative powers concerned with? First, they 
are normally directed – they are owed to particular others. Consent-sensitive 
duties are owed to the person with the power to consent. Promise-sensitive 
duties are normally owed by the person with the power to promise to the 
promisee. This is less obvious in the case of authority – it is not obvious that 
the duties that arise through political authority, for example, are owed to those 
with the authority. And there are clearer cases where the duty is not directed 
to the person exercising the power. Trustees, for example, have the normative 
power to determine rights and duties, but duties are not owed to the trustee, 
but to the beneficiary. In this case, the trustee exercises the power on behalf of 
the beneficiary.  
Second, normative powers affect pro tanto rights and duties – rights and 
duties that may be permissibly overridden by other considerations. For 
example, if I promise you to loan you my car for you to go to a concert, but it 
turns out that I unexpectedly need it to take my sick child to hospital, I am not 
required to loan you the car. My pro tanto duty is overridden by the importance 
of a task that it conflicts with. This is not surprising, because whatever values 
underpin normative powers, they are not as important as many other things 
that can ground rights and duties, such as preventing imminent disaster.  
 Where normative powers involve releasing others from duties, they 
only release others from the duties that the normative power is concerned with. 
And that may make no difference to what the person is permitted to do overall, 
because other considerations ground the duty to do the same thing that the 
consentee consents to. Consider: 
 
Consent and Promise: Harry, Wanda and Fred are housemates. Harry 
wants to use Fred’s car. Wanda promises him that she won’t use it, even 
if Harry allows her to. Harry says to Wanda and Fred that either of them 
are free to use the car.   
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Wanda does not wrong Fred if she uses the car. But it is nevertheless wrong for 
her to use it; doing so wrongs Harry. Thus, Fred’s consent releases Wanda from 
her directed consent-sensitive duty, but not from all of her duties not to do the 
thing consented to. This can make a difference to what a person owes in the 
case of a breach of the duty. If Wanda uses the car, she owes an apology to 
Harry, but not to Fred.  
Furthermore, there may be value in normative powers, even where this 
does not affect what the person is permitted to do overall. Harry may wish to 
make it true that Wanda does not owe it to him not to use the car, whilst 
recognising that he cannot release her from all of her duties not to use it. 
 Can the exercise of a normative power release a person from power-
sensitive duty owed to a person, whilst a decisive duty to that very same person 
is still in place? I’m not sure. The possibility that we are considering is that I 
owe you two duties, with different sources, not to v. One of those duties is 
power-sensitive, and you exercise the power. Might I still be bound by the other 
duty, that is either not power-sensitive (or the power is not exercised)? If this 
is possible, by acting, the wrongdoer wrongs that person, but without violating 
the particular duty that she owes to that person.  
Consider:  
 
Tattoo: I consent to your using my tattoo pen to draw a horrific tattoo on 
me.  
 
Let us suppose that I have the power validly to consent to your using my tattoo 
pen, but not to draw a horrific tattoo on me; there are  limits to what we can 
consent to, and let’s say that the tattoo is so bad that I cannot consent to your 
giving it to me.  
One way to analyse the case is that you do not wrong me by using my 
tattoo pen without consent, but you nevertheless wrong me by disfiguring me. 
Another is that because you will use the tattoo pen wrongly, my consent to 
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your using it in this way is invalid. I think that the former idea is right: it is 
hard to see why Consent and Promise and Tattoo should be treated differently, 
and it is clear that Harry has the power to consent to Wanda using his car, even 
though she will use it wrongly.  
 
III. Intending to Alter Rights and Duties 
 
We have considered some basic cases which distinguish normative powers 
from non-normative powers to alter rights and duties. What is the mark of this 
distinction? One idea is that a person has the normative power to alter rights 
and duties if she has the power to do so intentionally. X intends Y to be 
permitted to use his bike in Bike I but not Bike II; X intends Y to be required to 
give Z the key in Key but not Key II; X intends to give himself a duty to lend Y 
his car in Car but not Car II.  
 An important feature of normative powers is that the person exercising 
them intends to alter rights and duties, at least in central cases. But is the 
successful execution of an intention to alter rights and duties necessary for the 
exercise of a normative power? And is it sufficient? I think that it is necessary 
but not sufficient, and seeing this helps us to understand the special way in 
which intentions are involved in normative powers. 
Let us consider two kinds of case that put pressure on the idea that 
intentions are necessary for the exercise of normative powers. I discussed the 
first in previous work, in the context of an investigation of whether consent 
involves the exercise of a normative power:3 
 
Internalised Slave: Terri consents to be Sandra’s slave. Both Terri and 
Sandra wrongly believe that Terri is thus Sandra’s slave: they wrongly 
think that the duty not to treat as a slave is consent-sensitive. Both thus 
believe that Sandra is permitted to do with Terri what she wishes, 
                                                 
3 See Wrongs and Crimes (Oxford: OUP, 2016) 211-2. 
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irrespective of consent. Terri and Sandra fall in love. Sandra needs a 
kidney transplant to save her life. Terri wishes Sandra to take her kidney 
– she says, truly, that she cannot bear to see Sandra die. As she loves 
Terri, Sandra takes Terri’s kidney only because Terri wills it.  
 
This case might challenge the view that consent involves the exercise of a 
normative power, but also the view that a person who exercises a normative 
power necessarily intends to alter another’s rights or duties. 
The challenges arise from the fact that Terri does not intend to alter 
Sandra’s duties with respect to the kidney, because she does not believe that 
Sandra has a duty not to take the kidney. Yet, it might seem, Terri consents to 
the taking of the kidney. Here is an argument that Terri has consented to 
Sandra taking the kidney:  
 
1) Terri’s consent is needed for Sandra to be permitted to take the kidney;  
2) Sandra is permitted to take the kidney because of Terri’s attitudes and 
actions with respect to taking the kidney, and nothing else that Terri 
does amounts to her consenting;  
3) Therefore, Terri’s attitudes and actions amount to her consenting to 
Sandra taking the kidney.   
 
Here is an extension of that argument to the view that normative powers do 
not involve intentions. 
 
4) Consent is a normative power. 
5) From 3) and 4), Terri has exercised a normative power. 
6) Terri does not intend to alter Sandra’s rights and duties, as she does not 
believe that she is able to do so. 
7) From 5) and 6), the exercise of normative powers need not involve an 
intention to alter rights and duties.  
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Overall, whilst this argument has some force, I think it should be resisted. 
In Wrongs and Crimes, I argued against 1). Here’s a clearer argument than 
I offered there. Normally, consent is required to permit a person taking 
another’s kidney. But sometimes, something other than consent will do. Now 
suppose that consent is a normative power which requires the intention 
directly to alter another’s rights and duties. As Terri does not recognise the 
duty that Sandra owes her not to take the kidney, Terri cannot consent. Often, 
when a person is unable to consent to something that is normally consent-
sensitive, respect for the person requires us to make decisions on the basis of 
something else about the person, such as what she wants, wills or would 
consent to if she were able. Because Terri is unable to consent, given her beliefs, 
Sandra should decide what to do on the basis of what Terri wants, wills, or 
would consent to if she were able. And that is to take the kidney. 
 This argument also suggests that Internalised Slave is no challenge to the 
view that normative powers involve intentions to alter rights and duties. Terri 
does not intend to alter Sandra’s duty not to take the kidney, as she does not 
believe that Sandra has any such duty. But then her willing Sandra to take the 
kidney does not involve the exercise of a normative power either. It is rather 
that Terri’s willing Sandra to take the kidney directly grounds Sandra’s 
permission to take the kidney.  
 In a second set of cases, people follow the conventions needed for the 
exercise of normative powers without having the relevant intentions. A 
standard example might be commercial contracts, where, it might be argued, 
following the conventions for the formation of such contracts is sufficient to 
make them binding, without the relevant intentions. This is necessary, it might 
be thought, to ensure that people can act in confidence that they are not 
wronging others.4 
Consider: 
                                                 
4 See, especially, R Bollinger ‘Moral Risk and Communicating Consent’ (2019) 
47 Philosophy and Public Affairs 179. 
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Joke: Xavier tells Yolanda that she is permitted to use his bike. But Xavier 
does not intend to release Yolanda from her duty not to use the bike. He 
is joking. She, though, has no reason to believe that he is joking, and so 
uses the bike. 
 
Some might think that Xavier has consented to Yolanda using his bike, and that 
consent therefore does not require an intention to alter rights and duties. 
 It is certainly true that Xavier has altered Yolanda’s duty not to use the 
bike, so that she has not wronged him by taking it. But this might be explained 
by something like rights-forfeiture rather than consent: by creating the 
impression that he consents, Xavier forfeits his right that Yolanda not use his 
bike. Rights forfeiture does not depend on the exercise of a normative powers. 
Similarly, those who sign commercial contracts without the relevant intentions 
forfeit their rights against the enforcement of these contracts without exercising 
normative powers.  
This view can be reinforced by noticing that the rights and duties of the 
recipient are not altered if she knows that the person communicating lacks the 
relevant intentions. Neither conventional consent nor conventional promise are 
transformative where the recipient knows that the person with the normative 
power is just joking, even if this is not clear from what she says and does.5 It 
thus seems that we can meet objections to the idea that an intention to alter 
another person’s rights and duties is necessary for the exercise of a normative 
power.  
                                                 
5 Bollinger makes it a condition of conventional consent that the person to 
whom consent is given does not have reason to believe that the person 
communicating lacks the relevant intentions. But this just points to the 
significance of those intentions – the reason why evidence of a lack of an 
intention is decisive is that intentions are necessary for consent. 
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The larger problem is that the successful execution of an intention to 
alter rights and duties is insufficient for the exercise of a normative power, and 
that is because a person might exercise her intention by indirectly altering 
rights and duties. To see this, suppose that X intends to alter the right and 
duties in the II cases by altering the facts that ground the relevant duties. For 
example, X might want Y to be permitted to use his bike in Bike II, and so leaves 
the gas on, which will be sufficient for Y to be permitted; X might want Y to be 
required to give Z the key in Key II and so locks Z’s child in the flat; X might 
want to be required to lend Y his car in Car II, and so breaks Y’s car. In all of 
these cases, X intends to alter rights and duties but does not exercise normative 
powers.  
One way to see this is that the facts that give rise to the relevant rights 
and duties, in the II cases, would be sufficient to ground those powers 
regardless of whether they arose due to X’s intention to bring about those rights 
and duties. For example, even if X intended Y to be permitted to use his bike in 
Bike II, the gas being on would be sufficient to permit Y to use X’s bike 
independently of that intention.  
I don’t intend this as an accurate test for the exercise of a normative 
power. There are funky cases where such a power is still not exercised, even 
though the person’s intention would be necessary to ground the relevant right 
or duty. Consider: 
 
Specific Critic: You are reluctant to criticize me, and I want to make it 
clear that you are permitted to do so to do so, so I make a racist remark 
to a colleague. 
 
Suppose that you are permitted or required to criticize me not only for making 
the racist remark, but also for intentionally altering your normative situation. 
Then, my intention to alter your rights and duties is necessary for you to have 
the relevant rights and duties, but I still don’t exercise a normative power.  Still, 
 14 
considering whether the intention is necessary for the right or duty to arise is a 
good ballpark test for whether a normative power has been exercised.  
 Perhaps it might be argued that normative powers exist where 
intentions regularly explain the rights and duties. 6  But, as I have argued 
elsewhere, even this is not enough.7 Consider: 
 
Intended Rescue: Karim intends that Layla has duties to rescue drowning 
children. A group of children is standing at the edge of a pond. Karim 
shouts ‘rescue Alice’. His shouting this with the relevant intention 
makes Alice nervous and she falls into the pond and Layla rescues her. 
He then shouts ‘rescue Bob’ and this makes Bob nervous and he falls 
into the pond and Layla rescues him. And so on.  
 
Layla regularly has the duty to rescue a child due to the execution of Karim’s 
intention that she has this duty. But Karim’s intention does not explain Layla’s 
duty in the right way for him to be exercising a normative power. His intention 
gives rise to Layla’s duty only by causing some independent ground of her 
duty, and not directly.  
This is so even if Layla relies on Karim’s intentions to decide what to do. 
Suppose, for example, that the only way in which she knows that children are 
drowning is by a machine which scrutinises Karim’s intentions. That gives her 
decisive evidence that Karim has shouted, and that a child is in the pond. Karim 
still doesn’t exercise a normative power. For the exercise of a normative power, 
the intentions of the person with the power must explain the rights and duties 
of others in the right way.  
 We can construct similar cases for other normative powers, and this 
helps to guide us to a general feature of these powers. Consider: 
                                                 
6 This seems to be the suggestion in D Enoch ‘Authority and Reason-Giving’ 
(2014) 89 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 296. 
7 See To Do, To Die, To Reason Why (Oxford: OUP, forthcoming) ch.4. 
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Intended Use: Betty wants her daughter, Cara, to learn to drive, but she 
doesn’t have a car. She wants Cara to be permitted to use the cars of the 
people down the street. So she regularly puts other kids in peril, where 
the only way that they can be rescued is for Cara to use her neighbours’ 
cars.  
 
Cara regularly has the permission to use her neighbours’ cars because Betty 
intends her to be permitted to use them. But Cara’s duty not to use these cars 
is not sensitive to Betty’s consent, and Betty does not in fact consent to Cara’s 
using them.  
A similar result follows even where there are consent-sensitive duties. 
Suppose, for example, that each rescue can be performed only if Cara uses 
Betty’s car. Betty could create the permission for Cara to use her car by 
consenting. But she does not do so in this case. Cara thus owes Betty a consent 
sensitive duty not to use her car; Betty intends that Cara does not have this 
duty; and she successfully executes that intention by making it true that Cara 
lacks this duty. Yet Betty does not consent. 
Here is the lesson for a theory of normative powers. A good theory of 
normative powers explains why the intention directly to alter rights and duties 
can be successfully executed directly. In other words, it should explain the fact 
that the exercise of a normative power is a distinctive kind of intentional 
activity, where one directly alters the rights and duties of oneself and others. 
To do this, such a theory should explain the basic moral significance of the 
distinctive kind of execution of the intentions of the person with the normative 
power.  
We have seen a wide range of cases where one person alters the rights 
and duties of another but does not do so through the exercise of a normative 
power. That is so even where one person intends to alter the rights and duties 
of another. In these cases, the successful execution of the relevant intention 
does not explain the alteration in the relevant rights and duties in the right way.  
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Can we give an account of what the right way is? The question is hard 
to answer, and I don’t have a complete answer. In cases like Bike II the 
explanation is that the facts that most immediately ground Y’s right are the 
independent result of X having the relevant intentions. We might say that X’s 
intentions cause, or give rise to, something else that then grounds Y’s right. But 
we can see from Specific Critic that directly does not merely mean ‘non-causal’. 
I can intentionally alter your rights and duties by acting in a way that grounds 
those rights and duties non-causally without exercising a normative power. 
Here is a rough answer that is better. Rights and duties play a role in 
practical reasoning. X’s duty not to v just is the appropriateness of X responding 
in a certain way to ving in her practical reasoning. The response is to treat 
herself as unfree to v. A fuller account of duties involves characterizing the kind 
of unfreedom involved, but we can work with the rough idea that if a person 
is required to act in a certain way, there is a certain moral sense in which she is 
not free to act in that way. This is in contrast with the case where the person 
has a decisive non-moral reason not to v, where although she ought not to v, 
she is morally free to do so. 
If this is an account of all things considered duties, how should we 
understand the kinds of pro tanto directed duties that normative powers are 
concerned with? Such a duty exists when the right set of facts about the 
relationship between the duty holder and the right holder exist. Facts about the 
right holder are the kind of facts that appropriately constrain the conduct of the 
duty holder.  
Where a person has a normative power, the execution of the power itself 
generates the relationship between duty holder and right holder that make it 
appropriately constrains the conduct of the duty holder, subject to defeating 
considerations. The person with the power can thus make it appropriate for a 
person to be morally free, or not, to v simply by executing her power. Nothing 
more is needed to make the person free, or not.  
Consider my power to consent to your using my pen. I can make it 
appropriate for you to take the attitude that you are morally free to use my pen 
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simply by doing whatever is sufficient for me to consent, subject to certain 
validity conditions being satisfied, and the absence of defeaters. And, in the 
introduction I suggested that successful communication that I consent is 
sufficient. By validly consenting, I generate a relationship between you and I 
that makes it appropriate for yourself to be free to use the pen, where otherwise 
you would not be, on condition that other extraneous facts do not restrict you 
from using it.   
Or consider my power to give myself a duty to take you to the airport 
by promising to do so. I can make it appropriate for me to take the attitude that 
I am not morally free to refrain from taking you simply by doing whatever is 
needed for me to promise to do so, subject to certain validity conditions being 
satisfied, and the absence of defeaters. And successful communication that I 
promise is sufficient. By validly promising to take you to the airport, I generate 
a relationship between you and I that makes it appropriate for me not to be free 
to refrain from taking you to the airport, on condition that other extraneous 
facts do not make me free to refrain from doing so.  
 
IV. Simple Instrumental Accounts 
 
With this (admittedly underdeveloped) characterisation of normative powers 
in hand, how do we explain their existence? Certain kinds of instrumental 
account might seem satisfactory: those that explain the role of intentions in the 
exercise of normative powers. An instrumental account of a normative power 
is that the normative power exists in order to serve some goal that is 
independent of the rights and duties of others. An instrumental account might 
seem to give the appropriate role to intentions if the goal in question is best 
served by the person with the power being able to alter the rights and duties of 
others if and only if she executes the relevant intentions. 
For example, here is a simple instrumental account of consent. With 
respect to some act, v, a person, X, has an especially powerful interest in others 
performing ving only if X is in some state, such as her wanting the action to be 
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done, or valuing its being done. The interests of others in the performance of 
such actions are normally insufficient to justify acting in that way where the 
person is not in that state. And X herself is best able to establish whether she is 
in the relevant state, which is normally true in the case of wanting and valuing.  
Here is an instrumental account of the significance of X’s consent for Y’s 
permission to perform the relevant act. 
 
1) X has a powerful interest in Y not ving unless she wants or values Y 
ving. 
2) Y almost certainly lacks sufficient evidence that X wants or values 
Y’s ving unless X communicates this to Y. 
3) Therefore, it is wrong for Y to v unless X communicates her that X 
wants or values Y ving. 
4) A practice where Y is permitted to v only if X consents to Y ving is 
the most effective practice of ensuring that Y vs only where X wants 
or values Y ving.  
5) Therefore, Y is permitted to v only if X consents. 
 
This account might seem well placed to explain why we are owed consent-
sensitive duties over things that we are intimately related to, such as bodily 
integrity, physical appearance, and sex. For example, a person has a very 
powerful interest in being tattooed only if she likes the tattoo; others have a 
much less powerful interest in tattooing the person; therefore, others owe that 
person a consent-sensitive duty not to tattoo her.  
 A good account of power-sensitive duties should certainly explain the 
scope of such duties in an appealing way, and a person’s interests seem at least 
part of the story. Why does a person mainly have normative powers to 
determine how her own mind and body is treated by others, and not the minds 
and bodies of others? Surely in part because of the special interests that she has 
in what happens to her own body.  
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The difficulty, though, is to find an instrumental argument for direct 
rather than indirect ways of altering rights and duties. The argument above 
does this through 4): consent is necessary, because there is no adequate 
alternative mechanism to determine what people like. But 4) does not seem 
very plausible. Something like advice could do the job, where if the advice is 
sufficiently compelling, the person would be required to act on it. But advising 
is not a normative power. 
 And note that consent is required even once a person has been advised 
of the consenter’s preferences. Suppose that X indicates to Y that X really wants 
a tattoo. That is insufficient to release Y of his duty not to give X the tattoo; X’s 
consent is required. If, for whatever reason, X does not consent, Y is not 
permitted to give X the tattoo.  
 Similar things can be said about other normative powers. For example, 
where X knows better than Y what should be done, X can ground Y’s duty by 
advising Y what should be done. But advice is insufficient for authority. So 
what explains X having authority over Y in particular, rather than X’s power 
indirectly to alter Y’s duties by giving Y advice?  
A similar problem arises in the case of promising. Where X wants to give 
himself a duty that Y can rely on, X can simply indicate to Y what he will do in 
a way that induces reliance in a way that is sufficient to ground that duty.8 
Promising is not needed. Simple instrumental accounts of normative powers, 
then, fail to explain those powers. 
 
V. Second Order Instrumentalism 
 
                                                 
8 As T M Scanlon’s account of promising (or perhaps I should say ‘promising’) 
in What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1998) ch.7 
suggests, we can add further features to make something close to the practice 
of promising attractive in a similar way to actual promising without relying on 
normative powers. 
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One response to the argument just made is that normative powers might be 
more effective than alternative mechanisms in ensuring that people respond 
appropriately to the interests that are sufficient to ground rights and duties. 
Suppose, for example, that people tend to respect an important interest more 
effectively if the person has the power directly to alter her rights and duties 
than if she can only do so indirectly. People might be better disposed to 
respond to commands than advice, for example. Is that a good argument for 
her having such a normative power? I doubt it.  
 
i) Duties and Proxies 
 
First, focus on this more general question: suppose that some fact, f, is 
sufficiently important to ground a duty. However, a person, X, tends not to 
respond to f directly as well as she tends to respond to some proxy for that fact, 
p. Does X then have a duty to respond to p? Here is an argument that she does:  
 
1) X has a first order duty grounded in f.  
2) Other things equal, X has a second order duty to ensure that she 
fulfils her first order duties. 
3) X can best ensure that she fulfils her first order duty grounded in f 
by responding to p. 
4) Therefore, X has a second order duty to respond to p. 
 
Consider how this argument might apply to the case of consent to have a tattoo: 
 
1) X has a first order duty grounded in Y’s interest in having a tattoo 
only if she wants to have it. 
2) Other things equal, X has a second order duty to ensure that she 
fulfils her duty not to give Y a tattoo if Y does not want it. 
3) X can best ensure that she fulfils her duty not to give Y a tattoo if Y 
does not want it by tattooing Y only if Y consents. 
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4) Therefore, X has a second order duty to give Y a tattoo only if Y 
consents. 
 
This kind of argument might then support the existence of Y having the 
normative power to consent on the basis of the following premise: 
 
Instrument: Y has the normative power with respect to X’s duties with 
respect to v just in case her having this power will result in X better 
complying with his second order duty to ensure that he does his first 
order duty with respect to v. 
 
This is a generalised variation on a well-known view about authority:  Joseph 
Raz’s well known service conception of authority.9 It is generalised, in that it 
applies to all normative powers. And it is a variation in that Raz’s view is 
concerned with compliance with reasons rather than with first order duties. 
This variation is an improvement in that respect, though, as it is a mystery, on 
Raz’s own view, how a mere first order reason can be converted into a second 
order duty on a purely instrumental basis.10 
 The fact that this kind of argument can be mounted for consent as well 
as authority might give us some confidence in it, given my earlier suggestion 
that we have at least some reason to expect a general theory of normative 
powers. And we can easily imagine extending it to at least some further 
normative powers – for example, we might think that the duty to keep 
                                                 
9  See The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: OUP, 1986) Part I; ‘The Problem of 
Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception’ in Between Authority and 
Interpretation (Oxford: OUP, 2009). 
10 This is more fully spelled out in J Quong Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: 
OUP, 2011) ch.2. See, further, V Tadros To Do, To Die, To Reason Why (Oxford: 
OUP, forthcoming) ch.4. 
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promises is a duty to comply with the second order duty to ensure compliance 
with the first order duty not to disappoint legitimate expectations. And so on.   
 This kind of view can be improved by adding further constraints to the 
existence of normative powers. In the context of authority, for example, Raz 
adds a condition – that authority does not exist in cases where it is especially 
important that a person acts on her own judgement (what he calls the 
independence condition). And we could add further constraints of this kind.  
Even with constraints added, though, I doubt that second order 
instrumentalism provides a good account of normative powers, or at least of 
core cases of such powers. To demonstrate this, it is worth considering two 
kinds of case. In the first kind, X is able to comply with his first order duties 
directly, without relying Y’s decisions, but X is poorly disposed to do this. In 
the second kind, X is unable to do what he would otherwise be required to do, 
or to decide to do that, without Y’s decision. 
 
ii) Abilities, Dispositions and Duties 
 
In the first kind of case, X can directly respond to the facts that ground his first 
order duties without relying on the proxy that Y creates. Y’s reason to create 
the proxy, in that case, has nothing to do with X’s abilities, but with X’s 
disposition not to exercise those abilities in the right way. This might be true 
for a range of reasons. For example, X might have poor judgement, and so be 
disposed not to see the relevant facts as duty-conferring, or X might be poorly 
motivated to comply with his duties.  
If X is more likely to respond to the proxy than directly to the facts that 
ground his first order duty, X may have a duty to respond to the proxy rather 
than failing to do what his first order duty requires of him. But this does not 
show that he is required to respond to the proxy simpliciter. And, it seems, he 
is not so required, because he could ignore the proxy and respond directly to 
the facts that ground his first order duty. The fact that he won’t take this 
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alternative does not show that it is irrelevant to determining what he is 
required to do.  
To see this, consider three things that X might do: 
 
a) Violate his first order duty 
b) Conform to his first order duty by responding to the facts that 
directly ground that duty. 
c) Conform to his first order duty by responding to the proxy.  
 
To show that X has a duty to choose b), it must be shown that all other options 
are wrongful. But c) is not wrongful, and X has the option of picking c). The 
fact that he won’t pick that option cannot make him required to pick b).  
 Consider consent. Suppose that the fact that Y doesn’t want a tattoo is 
sufficient to ground a first order duty on X not to give Y the tattoo, but that if 
Y wants the tattoo, X lacks this duty. Y’s consent, let us suppose, involves 
sincerely saying ‘I give you permission to tattoo me’. Now suppose that Y’s 
consent is just a proxy for what Y wants. If Y gives consent, X has sufficient 
reason to conclude that Y wants the tattoo; if Y refrains, X has sufficient reason 
to conclude that Y doesn’t want the tattoo. Now suppose that X is bad at 
responding to what Y wants, but good at responding to Y’s consent. Then X 
should respond to Y’s lack of consent by refraining from giving Y the tattoo 
rather than giving Y the tattoo.  
But that does not show that X is required to respond to Y’s consent. X 
could do just as well by responding directly to the fact that Y either does or 
does not want the tattoo. Suppose that Y consents because she wants the tattoo. 
X is then permitted to give Y the tattoo. But X need not respond to the fact that 
Y consented. He could just as well respond directly to the fact that Y wants the 
tattoo. And suppose that Y does not consent because she does not want the 
tattoo. X is then required not to give Y the tattoo. But X could just respond to 
the fact that Y does not want the tattoo. Thus, Y’s consent does not alter X’s 
rights and duties. It makes no difference to what X is required to do, for we can 
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set out the complete set of rights and duties that X has simply with reference to 
what Y wants without mentioning the proxy. If X responds to Y’s wants, he has 
no further work to do to determine what he is required to do. 
A similar thing is true in the case of authority. Suppose that X has a first 
order duty to rescue a drowning child. Y commands X to rescue the child, and 
X is more strongly disposed to respond to Y’s commands than to the value of 
the child’s life. X has a duty to follow Y’s commands rather than failing to rescue 
the child. But this does not show that X has a duty to follow Y’s commands 
simpliciter. X could ignore those commands and just rescue the child because 
her life is important. Thus, X does not have a duty to follow Y’s commands.11 
 
iii) Creating New Opportunities 
 
Some might respond to this problem by noting that proxies might give rise to 
opportunities that the person would lack without those proxies. Normative 
powers, it might be argued, exist where their exercise creates these 
opportunities. For example, suppose that X is not ill disposed to respond to 
what Y wants; he is unable to do so. And suppose that the only way to make X 
able to respond to those wants is for Y to say things like: I permit you to v; or I 
don’t permit you to v. That, it might be argued, blocks the argument in the 
previous subsection, because X’s duties are genuinely altered by the exercise of 
normative powers; their exercise creates new opportunities, and that alters 
what X is required to do. 
 The problem with this response is that although the creation of new 
opportunities might genuinely give rise to new rights or duties, it does not do 
so in the right way for the exercise of a normative power. Rather, there is a mere 
triggering of a new right or duty. To see this, suppose that X is permitted to do 
what Y wants if X can, simply because Y wants it. Now consider: 
                                                 
11 For a more complete and developed argument of this kind about authority, 
see V Tadros To Do, To Die, To Reason Why ch.4. 
 25 
 
Tattoo Box: Y wants a tattoo of a unicorn identical to the one on a picture 
in a sealed box, and if she cannot have that, she doesn’t want a tattoo at 
all. X cannot give Y this tattoo without having the picture to copy. If Y 
says ‘I permit you to tattoo me’, the box will open, and then X will be 
able to give Y the tattoo. 
 
By saying ‘I permit you to tattoo me’, Y makes it true that X is permitted to 
tattoo Y. Now suppose that the only ground of Y’s normative power is the 
significance of Y getting what he wants. Although Y’s communication results 
in X being permitted to tattoo Y, Y does not exercise a normative power. Rather, 
Y triggers an opportunity, which X is permitted to take simply for independent 
reasons – because Y wants to be tattooed. Thus, creating new opportunities to 
perform valuable actions does not explain normative powers. 
 
VI. Appropriateness and Normative Powers 
 
In the remainder of the essay I sketch some responses to the failure of 
instrumental arguments for normative powers. One response is to reject the 
existence of true normative powers. Perhaps we don’t really have any such 
powers in the truest sense. We only have abilities to trigger rights and duties 
indirectly by affecting independent grounds of duties and rights, or evidence 
about those grounds. We might even offer a debunking explanation for the 
appearance that we have normative powers. Perhaps our belief that we have 
these things makes us better able to serve the instrumental purposes of the kind 
outlined earlier. That may be right, and there is certainly something mysterious 
about normative powers, but our intuitions about them are quite robust. So I 
am reluctant to give up on them so quickly.  
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David Owens offers one possible explanation. 12 He claims that we have 
normative powers because we have distinctly normative interests. Normative 
interests are interests that are concerned with whether certain  normative facts 
themselves obtain, or whether things that are closely related to certain 
normative facts themselves obtain. Owens own argument for such interests is 
mainly an argument from intuition. We know that we can directly alter the 
rights and duties of others through the exercise of normative powers; this fact 
can only be adequately explained by the existence of normative interests; 
therefore, we have normative interests. 
We should distinguish two different ideas, each of which can be found 
in Owens’ work. On one view, our basic normative interest is in ourselves or 
others having certain rights and duties. From that, we have a derivative interest 
in having normative powers, for by having them we can advance our more 
basic normative interests. I think that this is how Owens normally understands 
the idea of a normative interest. Such interests, if we have them, might explain 
normative powers in this way. If a person has an interest in herself or others 
having rights and duties as such, wouldn’t it be better that the person can make 
it the case that she is able to make it true that she or others have rights or duties 
simply by some simple act of expression or communication, or even just some 
mental act?  
A second view, and one that Owens’ work also sometimes suggests, is 
that we have a basic interest in having normative powers themselves – powers 
directly to alter rights and duties - rather than interests in the rights and duties 
that these powers give rise to. We, or others, have rights and duties because the 
existence of these rights and duties makes normative powers possible, and we 
have a basic interest in those powers. Owens, for example, thinks that this helps 
to explain the rights and duties involved in friendship. We have an interest in 
being able to control our normative environment; we have that ability if we 
have the ability to form friendships, where friendships are partly constituted 
                                                 
12 Shaping the Normative Landscape. 
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by certain rights and duties; therefore the rights and duties involved in 
friendship are explained by our interest in having the ability to control our 
normative environment. 
In previous work, I also offered an argument for the second view in the 
context of consent. The power to consent, I suggested, gives us the ability to 
shape our relations with others by altering what they are permitted to do. This 
is most obvious in the case of monogamous sexual relations – by only 
consenting to sex with one’s partner, one distinguishes one’s partner from 
others in one’s sexual life, and that is a meaningful way of forming a 
relationship with him or her. Note that it is insufficient for monogamous 
relationships to exist, or to have the value that they have, that people in fact 
have exclusive rights to have sex with each other. They depend on the fact that 
sexual partners exclusively grant each other the permission to have sex with 
each other by exercising a power that they could exercise in other ways. Thus, 
the value of monogamous relationships depends on the power to consent, or 
not, and not merely on the rights and duties that consent, or its lack, gives rise 
to.    
 Whilst I still think that these ideas help to show that normative powers 
can be valuable in themselves, and not merely because of our interest in 
normative outcomes, I doubt that they are the whole story, or even the most 
important story, in explaining normative powers. One reason for doubt is that 
it is hard to extend the ideas in the previous paragraph to all normative powers. 
They are most naturally employed with respect to the normative powers that 
govern our ability to develop our interpersonal relations with others. But 
normative powers have a role in a wide range of contexts. It is harder to see 
how, for example, authority or abandonment could be justified in anything like 
this way, and it is hard to see how central instances of consent and promising 
that are not about interpersonal relations are explained in this way – 
commercial contracts, for example, or the role of consent in medicine. 
 More importantly, our interest in forming relationships by altering 
rights and duties does not seem to be sufficiently fundamental and important 
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to explain why normative powers, including the power to consent, have the 
importance they have in ordinary moral life. Can we really fully or adequately 
explain why it is wrong to have sex with someone without their consent, where 
no other interest is set back, by pointing to a person’s interests in determining 
which relationships to form with others by consenting? That seems doubtful.  
A third view is that normative powers are just morally basic. We just 
have the power to alter rights and duties, on this view, and no further 
grounding explanation can be offered. But even if such powers are basic, to 
meet debunking arguments we should be able to explicate what those powers 
involve in a way that is sufficiently compelling to explain their significance in 
moral life. 
Here is an attempt to do this. Not all norms are justified by, or grounded 
in, interests. Some exist because the conduct that the norm prohibits or requires, 
or the attitudes that would cause a person to act in the relevant way, are 
justified simply because they are an appropriate response to something of 
value, and not because of any interest of any sentient creature. Normative 
powers might be explained by the appropriate reaction that others have to our 
decisions. On this view, appropriateness directly explains normative powers 
without appealing to interests that people have.13  
Here are some examples of norms that are not grounded in interests. 
Many will find at least some of these examples compelling instances of the 
existence of norms that are not grounded in interests, even if they need careful 
elaboration. I might owe it to you to give you a proper burial after you are dead. 
But you don’t have an interest in a proper burial. It might be wrong to walk 
over someone’s grave, but that need not set back any interest that anyone has. 
It might be appropriate to feel guilty at having beaten my dog, but not because 
                                                 
13 Owens also gives a role to appropriateness: a person’s interests in certain 
things being appropriate explain why they are appropriate. See Shaping the 
Normative Landscape 8. This appeal to interests plays no part in the view I go on 
to describe.  
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anyone has an interest in my feeling guilty. It might wrong to destroy a 
beautiful landscape, simply because restricting one’s conduct is an appropriate 
response to its beauty, but landscape does not have interests, and if no one will 
appreciate it, no one else has an interest in its persisting.  
 At least some normative powers seem best explained by 
appropriateness too. This seems true of consent, for example. Consider the fact 
that doctors are required to get consent of their patients before operating on 
them or giving them medicine. This practice is warranted even where it 
conflicts with the interests of the patient. It might seem that this practice can be 
justified wholly on interest-based grounds – for example that patients have 
special insight into what is best for them, or that it is especially bad for a person 
to be operated on against her will. But, as we have seen, these explanations are 
not extensionally adequate.  
 An alternative explanation is that it is appropriate that patients are in 
control of the rights and duties of doctors. Consider how it is appropriate to 
respond to the fact that patients are embodied autonomous agents, whose 
value is not only realised through ensuring that their welfare is advanced, but 
in the shaping of their lives through the decisions they make. It is appropriate 
for doctors to govern their practical reasoning by responding to the decisions 
of patients.  
 Some might respond that it is the patient’s interest in living an 
autonomous life that makes consent important. But I doubt that this is right. A 
patient is in control even where her decisions set back her interest in living an 
autonomous life overall. For example, a patient might refuse treatment that will, 
overall, enhance her autonomy, and thus her interest in living an autonomous 
life is set back by her refusal. But her refusal is still decisive. Her decision is to 
be respected rather than promoted. And that is just to say that the appropriate 
response for the doctor to make to the patient’s decision is acknowledge a 
constraint on his conduct.  
 Similar arguments can be offered for other normative powers. Consider 
political authority. Instrumentalist conceptions of authority such as those we 
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considered earlier struggle to explain normative powers in particular. A better 
view is that an appropriate response to the decisions of a political community, 
where it is properly constituted, is to restrict one’s scope for autonomous 
practical reasoning. In doing so, we respect the significance of collective 
decision-making as such. This is not because our interests as autonomous 
agents are advanced in this way – these decisions are significant where they are 
appropriately made even where they are suboptimal, and where more value 




I have mainly made progress in clarifying the right questions to ask about 
normative powers by identifying the features that they have. I have also argued 
that some tempting arguments for such powers fail, because they fail to explain 
those features. I have only sketched an account of normative powers that might 
explain the particular features that they have. Much more would need to be 
done to make this account convincing. But there is at least some promise in the 
idea that normative powers are basic – that we have them simply because it is 
appropriate that we, and others, respond to our decisions in practical reasoning 
by drawing conclusions about what we are free to do.  
 
                                                 
14 There are significant content-based limits to this idea. For discussion, see V 
Tadros To Do, To Die, To Reason Why ch.3. 
